* Mention the first master branch SHA that introduced Terraform
v0.13 forward compatibility
* Link the migration guide on Github until a release is available
and website docs are published
* DigitalOcean introduced Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) support
to match other clouds and enhance the prior "private networking"
feature. Before, droplet's belonging to different clusters (but
residing in the same region) could reach one another (although
Typhoon firewall rules prohibit this). Now, droplets in a VPC
reside in their own network
* https://www.digitalocean.com/docs/networking/vpc/
* Create droplet instances in a VPC per cluster. This matches the
design of Typhoon AWS, Azure, and GCP.
* Require `terraform-provider-digitalocean` v1.16.0+ (action required)
* Output `vpc_id` for use with an attached DigitalOcean
loadbalancer
* Build Kubelet container images internally and publish
to Quay and Dockerhub (new) as an alternative in case of
registry outage or breach
* Use our infra to provide single and multi-arch (default)
Kublet images for possible future use
* Docs: Show how to use alternative Kubelet images via
snippets and a systemd dropin (builds on #737)
Changes:
* Update docs with changes to Kubelet image building
* If you prefer to trust images built by Quay/Dockerhub,
automated image builds are still available with unique
tags (albeit with some limitations):
* Quay automated builds are tagged `build-{short_sha}`
(limit: only amd64)
* Dockerhub automated builts are tagged `build-{tag}`
and `build-master` (limit: only amd64, no shas)
Links:
* Kubelet: https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet
* Docs: https://typhoon.psdn.io/topics/security/#container-images
* Registries:
* quay.io/poseidon/kubelet
* docker.io/psdn/kubelet
* Promote DigitalOcean from alpha to beta for Fedora
CoreOS and Flatcar Linux
* Upgrade mkdocs-material and PyPI packages for docs
* Replace docs mentions of Container Linux with Flatcar
Linux and move docs/cl to docs/flatcar-linux
* Deprecate CoreOS Container Linux support. Its still
usable for some time, but start removing docs
* Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver
* Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that
may be used as a bootstrap token
* Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token)
to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use
the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver
as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for
kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue
a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours)
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper`
ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole
* Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the
scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of
the node itself
* Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained
as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups
need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need
continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting
itself maliciously
Security notes:
1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME`
and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization
to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction
admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This
is the primary security motivation.
2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity
as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig.
It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still
allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig
3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers
a slight security improvement.
* An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the
bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew
their access
* A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled
by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token
to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client
certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However,
replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster
environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical
benefit.
* Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice
4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet
clients have more identity information, which can improve the
utility of audits and future features
Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/
Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
* Initial support for Flatcar Linux on Azure used the Flatcar
Linux Azure Marketplace images (e.g. `flatcar-stable`) in
https://github.com/poseidon/typhoon/pull/664
* Flatcar Linux Azure Marketplace images have some unresolved
items https://github.com/poseidon/typhoon/issues/703
* Until the Marketplace items are resolved, revert to requiring
Flatcar Linux's images be manually uploaded (like GCP and
DigitalOcean)
* No change to Fedora CoreOS modules
* For Container Linx AWS and Azure, change the `os_image` default
from coreos-stable to flatcar-stable
* For Container Linux GCP and DigitalOcean, change `os_image` to
be required since users should upload a Flatcar Linux image and
set the variable
* For Container Linux bare-metal, recommend users change the
`os_channel` to Flatcar Linux. No actual module change.
* Problem: Fedora CoreOS images are manually uploaded to GCP. When a
cluster is created with a stale image, Zincati immediately checks
for the latest stable image, fetches, and reboots. In practice,
this can unfortunately occur exactly during the initial cluster
bootstrap phase.
* Recommended: Upload the latest Fedora CoreOS image regularly
* Mitigation: Allow a failed bootstrap.service run (which won't touch
the done ConditionalPathExists) to be re-run by running `terraforma apply`
again. Add a known issue to CHANGES
* Update docs to show the current Fedora CoreOS stable version to
reduce likelihood users see this issue
Longer term ideas:
* Ideal: Fedora CoreOS publishes a stable channel. Instances will always
boot with the latest image in a channel. The problem disappears since
it works the same way AWS does
* Timer: Consider some timer-based approach to have zincati delay any
system reboots for the first ~30 min of a machine's life. Possibly just
configured on the controller node https://github.com/coreos/zincati/pull/251
* External coordination: For Container Linux, locksmith filled a similar
role and was disabled to allow CLUO to coordinate reboots. By running
atop Kubernetes, it was not possible for the reboot to occur before
cluster bootstrap
* Rely on https://github.com/coreos/zincati/issues/115 to delay the
reboot since bootstrap involves an SSH session
* Use path-based activation of zincati on controllers and set that
path at the end of the bootstrap process
Rel: https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/239
* Remove docs for the `asset_dir` variable and deprecate
it in CHANGES. It will be removed in an upcoming release
* Typhoon v1.17.0 introduced a new mechanism for managing
and distributing generated assets that stopped relying on
writing out to disk. `asset_dir` became optional and
defaulted to being unset / off (recommended)
* Kubernetes plans to stop releasing the hyperkube container image
* Upstream will continue to publish `kube-apiserver`, `kube-controller-manager`,
`kube-scheduler`, and `kube-proxy` container images to `k8s.gcr.io`
* Upstream will publish Kubelet only as a binary for distros to package,
either as a DEB/RPM on traditional distros or a container image on
container-optimized operating systems
* Typhoon will package the upstream Kubelet (checksummed) and its
dependencies as a container image for use on CoreOS Container Linux,
Flatcar Linux, and Fedora CoreOS
* Update the Typhoon container image security policy to list
`quay.io/poseidon/kubelet`as an official distributed artifact
Hyperkube: https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/88676
Kubelet Container Image: https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet
Kubelet Quay Repo: https://quay.io/repository/poseidon/kubelet
* Stop providing example manifests for the Container Linux
Update Operator (CLUO)
* CLUO requires patches to support Kubernetes v1.16+, but the
project and push access is rather unowned
* CLUO hasn't been in active use in our clusters and won't be
relevant beyond Container Linux. Not to say folks can't patch
it and run it on their own. Examples just aren't provided here
Related: https://github.com/coreos/container-linux-update-operator/pull/197
* Accept `os_image` "flatcar-stable" and "flatcar-beta" to
use Kinvolk's Flatcar Linux images from the Azure Marketplace
Note: Flatcar Linux Azure Marketplace images require terms be
accepted before use
Dalton Hubble
Eldon