2016-10-09 02:04:54 +02:00
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import re
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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from cryptography import x509
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2018-06-20 17:42:34 +02:00
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from cryptography.exceptions import UnsupportedAlgorithm, InvalidSignature
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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from cryptography.x509 import NameOID
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from flask import current_app
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2016-10-15 09:04:35 +02:00
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from marshmallow.exceptions import ValidationError
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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from lemur.auth.permissions import SensitiveDomainPermission
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2018-06-20 17:42:34 +02:00
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from lemur.common.utils import check_cert_signature, is_weekend
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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def common_name(value):
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"""If the common name could be a domain name, apply domain validation rules."""
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# Common name could be a domain name, or a human-readable name of the subject (often used in CA names or client
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# certificates). As a simple heuristic, we assume that human-readable names always include a space.
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# However, to avoid confusion for humans, we also don't count spaces at the beginning or end of the string.
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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if " " not in value.strip():
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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return sensitive_domain(value)
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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def sensitive_domain(domain):
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"""
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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Checks if user has the admin role, the domain does not match sensitive domains and whitelisted domain patterns.
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:param domain: domain name (str)
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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:return:
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"""
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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if SensitiveDomainPermission().can():
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# User has permission, no need to check anything
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return
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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whitelist = current_app.config.get("LEMUR_WHITELISTED_DOMAINS", [])
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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if whitelist and not any(re.match(pattern, domain) for pattern in whitelist):
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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raise ValidationError(
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"Domain {0} does not match whitelisted domain patterns. "
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"Contact an administrator to issue the certificate.".format(domain)
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)
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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2018-06-20 17:42:34 +02:00
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# Avoid circular import.
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from lemur.domains import service as domain_service
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2019-05-30 19:21:44 +02:00
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if domain_service.is_domain_sensitive(domain):
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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raise ValidationError(
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"Domain {0} has been marked as sensitive. "
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"Contact an administrator to issue the certificate.".format(domain)
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)
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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2016-06-09 01:41:31 +02:00
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def encoding(oid_encoding):
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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"""
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Determines if the specified oid type is valid.
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2016-06-09 01:41:31 +02:00
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:param oid_encoding:
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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:return:
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"""
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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valid_types = ["b64asn1", "string", "ia5string"]
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2016-06-09 01:41:31 +02:00
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if oid_encoding.lower() not in [o_type.lower() for o_type in valid_types]:
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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raise ValidationError(
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"Invalid Oid Encoding: {0} choose from {1}".format(
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oid_encoding, ",".join(valid_types)
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)
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)
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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def sub_alt_type(alt_type):
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"""
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Determines if the specified subject alternate type is valid.
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:param alt_type:
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:return:
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"""
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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valid_types = [
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"DNSName",
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"IPAddress",
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"uniFormResourceIdentifier",
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"directoryName",
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"rfc822Name",
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"registrationID",
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"otherName",
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"x400Address",
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"EDIPartyName",
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]
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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if alt_type.lower() not in [a_type.lower() for a_type in valid_types]:
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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raise ValidationError(
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"Invalid SubAltName Type: {0} choose from {1}".format(
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type, ",".join(valid_types)
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)
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)
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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def csr(data):
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"""
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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Determines if the CSR is valid and allowed.
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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:param data:
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:return:
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"""
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try:
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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request = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(data.encode("utf-8"), default_backend())
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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except Exception:
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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raise ValidationError("CSR presented is not valid.")
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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# Validate common name and SubjectAltNames
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2020-07-01 15:44:06 +02:00
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try:
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for name in request.subject.get_attributes_for_oid(NameOID.COMMON_NAME):
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common_name(name.value)
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except ValueError as err:
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current_app.logger.info("Error parsing Subject from CSR: %s", err)
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raise ValidationError("Invalid Subject value in supplied CSR")
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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try:
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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alt_names = request.extensions.get_extension_for_class(
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x509.SubjectAlternativeName
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)
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2017-08-17 04:24:49 +02:00
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for name in alt_names.value.get_values_for_type(x509.DNSName):
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sensitive_domain(name)
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except x509.ExtensionNotFound:
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pass
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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def dates(data):
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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if not data.get("validity_start") and data.get("validity_end"):
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raise ValidationError("If validity start is specified so must validity end.")
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if not data.get("validity_end") and data.get("validity_start"):
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raise ValidationError("If validity end is specified so must validity start.")
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if data.get("validity_start") and data.get("validity_end"):
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if not current_app.config.get("LEMUR_ALLOW_WEEKEND_EXPIRATION", True):
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if is_weekend(data.get("validity_end")):
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raise ValidationError("Validity end must not land on a weekend.")
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if not data["validity_start"] < data["validity_end"]:
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raise ValidationError("Validity start must be before validity end.")
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if data.get("authority"):
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if (
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data.get("validity_start").date()
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< data["authority"].authority_certificate.not_before.date()
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):
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raise ValidationError(
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"Validity start must not be before {0}".format(
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data["authority"].authority_certificate.not_before
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)
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)
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if (
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data.get("validity_end").date()
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> data["authority"].authority_certificate.not_after.date()
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):
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raise ValidationError(
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"Validity end must not be after {0}".format(
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data["authority"].authority_certificate.not_after
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)
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)
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2016-05-09 20:00:16 +02:00
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2016-10-15 09:04:35 +02:00
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return data
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2018-06-20 17:42:34 +02:00
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def verify_private_key_match(key, cert, error_class=ValidationError):
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"""
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Checks that the supplied private key matches the certificate.
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:param cert: Parsed certificate
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:param key: Parsed private key
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:param error_class: Exception class to raise on error
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"""
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if key.public_key().public_numbers() != cert.public_key().public_numbers():
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raise error_class("Private key does not match certificate.")
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2018-06-20 17:42:34 +02:00
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def verify_cert_chain(certs, error_class=ValidationError):
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"""
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Verifies that the certificates in the chain are correct.
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We don't bother with full cert validation but just check that certs in the chain are signed by the next, to avoid
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basic human errors -- such as pasting the wrong certificate.
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:param certs: List of parsed certificates, use parse_cert_chain()
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:param error_class: Exception class to raise on error
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"""
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cert = certs[0]
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for issuer in certs[1:]:
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# Use the current cert's public key to verify the previous signature.
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# "certificate validation is a complex problem that involves much more than just signature checks"
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try:
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check_cert_signature(cert, issuer.public_key())
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except InvalidSignature:
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# Avoid circular import.
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from lemur.common import defaults
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2019-05-16 16:57:02 +02:00
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raise error_class(
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"Incorrect chain certificate(s) provided: '%s' is not signed by '%s'"
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% (
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defaults.common_name(cert) or "Unknown",
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defaults.common_name(issuer),
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)
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)
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2018-06-20 17:42:34 +02:00
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except UnsupportedAlgorithm as err:
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current_app.logger.warning("Skipping chain validation: %s", err)
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# Next loop will validate that *this issuer* cert is signed by the next chain cert.
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cert = issuer
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