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* Kubernetes plans to stop releasing the hyperkube container image * Upstream will continue to publish `kube-apiserver`, `kube-controller-manager`, `kube-scheduler`, and `kube-proxy` container images to `k8s.gcr.io` * Upstream will publish Kubelet only as a binary for distros to package, either as a DEB/RPM on traditional distros or a container image on container-optimized operating systems * Typhoon will package the upstream Kubelet (checksummed) and its dependencies as a container image for use on CoreOS Container Linux, Flatcar Linux, and Fedora CoreOS * Update the Typhoon container image security policy to list `quay.io/poseidon/kubelet`as an official distributed artifact Hyperkube: https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/88676 Kubelet Container Image: https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet Kubelet Quay Repo: https://quay.io/repository/poseidon/kubelet
56 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
56 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security
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Typhoon aims to be minimal and secure. We're running it ourselves after all.
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## Overview
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**Kubernetes**
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* etcd with peer-to-peer and client-auth TLS
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* Generated kubelet TLS certificates and `kubeconfig` (365 days)
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* [Role-Based Access Control](https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authorization/rbac/) is enabled. Apps must define RBAC policies
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* Workloads run on worker nodes only, unless they tolerate the master taint
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* Kubernetes [Network Policy](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/) and Calico [NetworkPolicy](https://docs.projectcalico.org/latest/reference/calicoctl/resources/networkpolicy) support [^1]
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[^1]: Requires `networking = "calico"`. Calico is the default on all platforms (AWS, Azure, bare-metal, DigitalOcean, and Google Cloud).
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**Hosts**
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* Container Linux auto-updates are enabled
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* Hosts limit logins to SSH key-based auth (user "core")
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**Platform**
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* Cloud firewalls limit access to ssh, kube-apiserver, and ingress
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* No cluster credentials are stored in Matchbox (used for bare-metal)
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* No cluster credentials are stored in Digital Ocean metadata
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* Cluster credentials are stored in AWS metadata (for ASGs)
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* Cluster credentials are stored in Azure metadata (for scale sets)
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* Cluster credentials are stored in Google Cloud metadata (for managed instance groups)
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* No account credentials are available to Digital Ocean droplets
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* No account credentials are available to AWS EC2 instances (no IAM permissions)
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* No account credentials are available to Azure instances (no IAM permissions)
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* No account credentials are available to Google Cloud instances (no IAM permissions)
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## Precautions
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Typhoon limits exposure to many security threats, but it is not a silver bullet. As usual,
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* Do not run untrusted images or accept manifests from strangers
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* Do not give untrusted users a shell behind your firewall
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* Define network policies for your namespaces
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## Container Images
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Typhoon uses upstream container images (where possible) and upstream binaries.
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!!! note
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Kubernetes releases `kubelet` as a binary for distros to package, either as a DEB/RPM on traditional distros or as a container image for container-optimized operating systems.
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Typhoon [packages](https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet) the upstream Kubelet and its dependencies as a [container image](https://quay.io/repository/poseidon/kubelet) for use in Typhoon. The upstream Kubelet binary is checksummed and packaged directly. Quay automated builds provide verifiability and confidence in image contents.
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## Disclosures
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If you find security issues, please email dghubble at gmail. If the issue lies in upstream Kubernetes, please inform upstream Kubernetes as well.
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