* Add experimental `arch` variable to Fedora CoreOS AWS,
accepting amd64 (default) or arm64 to support native
arm64/aarch64 clusters or mixed/hybrid clusters with
a worker pool of arm64 workers
* Add `daemonset_tolerations` variable to cluster module
(experimental)
* Add `node_taints` variable to workers module
* Requires flannel CNI and experimental Poseidon-built
arm64 Fedora CoreOS AMIs (published to us-east-1, us-east-2,
and us-west-1)
WARN:
* Our AMIs are experimental, may be removed at any time, and
will be removed when Fedora CoreOS publishes official arm64
AMIs. Do NOT use in production
Related:
* https://github.com/poseidon/typhoon/pull/682
* Allow a snippet with a systemd dropin to set an alternate
image via `ETCD_IMAGE`, for consistency across Fedora CoreOS
and Flatcar Linux
* Drop comments about integrating system containers with
systemd-notify
* CoreOS Container Linux was deprecated in v1.18.3
* Continue transitioning docs and modules from supporting
both CoreOS and Flatcar "variants" of Container Linux to
now supporting Flatcar Linux and equivalents
Action Required: Update the Flatcar Linux modules `source`
to replace `s/container-linux/flatcar-linux`. See docs for
examples
* Use docker to run the `kubelet.service` container
* Update Kubelet mounts to match Fedora CoreOS
* Remove unused `/etc/ssl/certs` mount (see
https://github.com/poseidon/typhoon/pull/810)
* Remove unused `/usr/share/ca-certificates` mount
* Remove `/etc/resolv.conf` mount, Docker default is ok
* Change `delete-node.service` to use docker instead of rkt
and inline ExecStart, as was done on Fedora CoreOS
* Fix permission denied on shutdown `delete-node`, caused
by the kubeconfig mount changing with the introduction of
node TLS bootstrap
Background
* podmand, rkt, and runc daemonless container process runners
provide advantages over the docker daemon for system containers.
Docker requires workarounds for use in systemd units where the
ExecStart must tail logs so systemd can monitor the daemonized
container. https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/6791
* Why switch then? On Flatcar Linux, podman isn't shipped. rkt
works, but isn't developing while container standards continue
to move forward. Typhoon has used runc for the Kubelet runner
before in Fedora Atomic, but its more low-level. So we're left
with Docker, which is less than ideal, but shipped in Flatcar
* Flatcar Linux appears to be shifting system components to
use docker, which does provide some limited guards against
breakages (e.g. Flatcar cannot enable docker live restore)
* Mention the first master branch SHA that introduced Terraform
v0.13 forward compatibility
* Link the migration guide on Github until a release is available
and website docs are published
* DigitalOcean introduced Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) support
to match other clouds and enhance the prior "private networking"
feature. Before, droplet's belonging to different clusters (but
residing in the same region) could reach one another (although
Typhoon firewall rules prohibit this). Now, droplets in a VPC
reside in their own network
* https://www.digitalocean.com/docs/networking/vpc/
* Create droplet instances in a VPC per cluster. This matches the
design of Typhoon AWS, Azure, and GCP.
* Require `terraform-provider-digitalocean` v1.16.0+ (action required)
* Output `vpc_id` for use with an attached DigitalOcean
loadbalancer
* Build Kubelet container images internally and publish
to Quay and Dockerhub (new) as an alternative in case of
registry outage or breach
* Use our infra to provide single and multi-arch (default)
Kublet images for possible future use
* Docs: Show how to use alternative Kubelet images via
snippets and a systemd dropin (builds on #737)
Changes:
* Update docs with changes to Kubelet image building
* If you prefer to trust images built by Quay/Dockerhub,
automated image builds are still available with unique
tags (albeit with some limitations):
* Quay automated builds are tagged `build-{short_sha}`
(limit: only amd64)
* Dockerhub automated builts are tagged `build-{tag}`
and `build-master` (limit: only amd64, no shas)
Links:
* Kubelet: https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet
* Docs: https://typhoon.psdn.io/topics/security/#container-images
* Registries:
* quay.io/poseidon/kubelet
* docker.io/psdn/kubelet
* Promote DigitalOcean from alpha to beta for Fedora
CoreOS and Flatcar Linux
* Upgrade mkdocs-material and PyPI packages for docs
* Replace docs mentions of Container Linux with Flatcar
Linux and move docs/cl to docs/flatcar-linux
* Deprecate CoreOS Container Linux support. Its still
usable for some time, but start removing docs
* Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver
* Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that
may be used as a bootstrap token
* Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token)
to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use
the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver
as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for
kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue
a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours)
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper`
ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole
* Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the
scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of
the node itself
* Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained
as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups
need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need
continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting
itself maliciously
Security notes:
1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME`
and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization
to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction
admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This
is the primary security motivation.
2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity
as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig.
It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still
allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig
3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers
a slight security improvement.
* An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the
bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew
their access
* A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled
by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token
to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client
certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However,
replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster
environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical
benefit.
* Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice
4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet
clients have more identity information, which can improve the
utility of audits and future features
Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/
Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
* Initial support for Flatcar Linux on Azure used the Flatcar
Linux Azure Marketplace images (e.g. `flatcar-stable`) in
https://github.com/poseidon/typhoon/pull/664
* Flatcar Linux Azure Marketplace images have some unresolved
items https://github.com/poseidon/typhoon/issues/703
* Until the Marketplace items are resolved, revert to requiring
Flatcar Linux's images be manually uploaded (like GCP and
DigitalOcean)
Dalton Hubble
Eldon