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* Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver * Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that may be used as a bootstrap token * Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token) to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours) * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper` ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole * Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of the node itself * Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting itself maliciously Security notes: 1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME` and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This is the primary security motivation. 2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig. It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig 3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers a slight security improvement. * An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew their access * A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However, replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical benefit. * Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice 4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet clients have more identity information, which can improve the utility of audits and future features Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/ Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185 |
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| fcc | ||
| bootstrap.tf | ||
| controllers.tf | ||
| LICENSE | ||
| network.tf | ||
| outputs.tf | ||
| README.md | ||
| ssh.tf | ||
| variables.tf | ||
| versions.tf | ||
| workers.tf | ||
Typhoon 
Typhoon is a minimal and free Kubernetes distribution.
- Minimal, stable base Kubernetes distribution
- Declarative infrastructure and configuration
- Free (freedom and cost) and privacy-respecting
- Practical for labs, datacenters, and clouds
Typhoon distributes upstream Kubernetes, architectural conventions, and cluster addons, much like a GNU/Linux distribution provides the Linux kernel and userspace components.
Features 
- Kubernetes v1.18.2 (upstream)
- Single or multi-master, Calico or flannel networking
- On-cluster etcd with TLS, RBAC-enabled, network policy
- Advanced features like snippets customization
- Ready for Ingress, Prometheus, Grafana, CSI, and other addons
Docs
Please see the official docs and the Digital Ocean tutorial.