* Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver
* Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that
may be used as a bootstrap token
* Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token)
to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use
the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver
as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for
kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue
a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours)
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper`
ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole
* Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the
scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of
the node itself
* Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained
as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups
need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need
continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting
itself maliciously
Security notes:
1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME`
and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization
to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction
admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This
is the primary security motivation.
2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity
as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig.
It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still
allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig
3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers
a slight security improvement.
* An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the
bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew
their access
* A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled
by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token
to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client
certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However,
replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster
environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical
benefit.
* Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice
4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet
clients have more identity information, which can improve the
utility of audits and future features
Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/
Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
* Stop providing example manifests for the Container Linux
Update Operator (CLUO)
* CLUO requires patches to support Kubernetes v1.16+, but the
project and push access is rather unowned
* CLUO hasn't been in active use in our clusters and won't be
relevant beyond Container Linux. Not to say folks can't patch
it and run it on their own. Examples just aren't provided here
Related: https://github.com/coreos/container-linux-update-operator/pull/197
* Add 2 min wait before KubeNodeUnreachable to be less
noisy on premeptible clusters
* Add a BlackboxProbeFailure alert for any failing probes
for services annotated `prometheus.io/probe: true`
* Change node-exporter DaemonSet tolerations from tolerating
all possible NoSchedule taints to tolerating the master taint
and the not ready taint (we'd like metrics regardless)
* Users who add custom node taints must add their custom taints
to the addon node-exporter DaemonSet. As an addon, its expected
users copy and manipulate manifests out-of-band in their own
systems
* Configure kube-proxy --metrics-bind-address=0.0.0.0 (default
127.0.0.1) to serve metrics on 0.0.0.0:10249
* Add firewall rules to allow Prometheus (resides on a worker) to
scrape kube-proxy service endpoints on controllers or workers
* Add a clusterIP: None service for kube-proxy endpoint discovery
* Stop mapping node labels to targets discovered via Kubernetes
nodes (e.g. etcd, kubelet, cadvisor). It is rarely useful to
store node labels (e.g. kubernetes.io/os=linux) on these metrics
* kube-apiserver's apiserver_request_duration_seconds_bucket metric
has a high cardinality that includes labels for the API group, verb,
scope, resource, and component for each object type, including for
each CRD. This one metric has ~10k time series in a typical cluster
(btw 10-40% of total)
* Removing the apiserver request duration outright would make latency
alerts a NoOp and break a Grafana apiserver panel. Instead, drop series
that have a "group" label. Effectively, only request durations for
core Kubernetes APIs will be kept (e.g. cardinality won't grow with
each CRD added). This reduces the metric to ~2k unique series
* kubernetes-mixin pod resource dashboards were split into
two ConfigMap parts because they provide richer networking
details
* New dashboards have been used by the author at the global
level, but were missing in the per-cluster Grafana tracked
here
* Add Prometheus alerts from node-exporter
* Add Grafana dashboard nodes.json, from node-exporter
* Not adding recording rules, since those are only used
by some node-exporter USE dashboards not being included
* Add default 10s refresh rate to custom dashboards to match
those from Kubernetes
* Show labels for "instance" as "pod" for clarity
* Add cluster filter for internal use
* Without the prometheus.io/port annotation, Prometheus
service discovery can scrape other Prometheus ports that
may be available.
* For example, Prometheus sidecars (not included) may
be scraped and that may be unintended
* addon-resizer is outdated and has been dropped from
kube-state-metrics examples. Those using it should look
to the cluster-proportional-vertical-autoscaler.
* Eliminate addon-resizer log spew
* Remove associated Role and RoleBinding
* Also fix kube-state-metrics readinessProbe port
* Update Prometheus rules/alerts and Grafana dashboards
* Remove dashboards that were moved to node-exporter, they
may be added back later if valuable
* Remove kube-prometheus based rules/alerts (ClockSkew alert)
* Prometheus was configured to use kubernetes discovery
of etcd targets based on nodes matching the node label
node-role.kubernetes.io/controller=true
* Kubernetes v1.16 stopped permitting node role labels
node-role.kubernetes.io/* so Typhoon renamed these labels
(no longer any association with roles) to
node.kubermetes.io/controller=true
* As a result, Prometheus didn't discover etcd targets,
etcd metrics were missing, etcd alerts were ineffective,
and the etcd Grafana dashboard was empty
* Introduced: https://github.com/poseidon/typhoon/pull/543
* Drop `node-role.kubernetes.io/master` and
`node-role.kubernetes.io/node` node labels
* Kubelet (v1.16) now rejects the node labels used
in the kubectl get nodes ROLES output
* https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/75457
* Use unique dashboard ID so that multiple replicas of Grafana
serve dashboards with uniform paths
* Fix issue where refreshing a dashboard served by one replica
could show a 404 unless the request went to the same replica
* Add a CoreDNS dashboard originally based on an upstream dashboard,
but now customized according to preferences
* Add an Nginx Ingress Controller based on an upstream dashboard,
but customized according to preferences
* This reverts commit 6e5d66cf66
* kube-state-metrics v1.6.0-rc.0 fires KubeDeploymentReplicasMismatch
alerts where its own Deployment doesn't have replicas available,
(kube_deployment_status_replicas_available) even though all replicas
are available according to kubectl inspection
* This problem was present even with the CSR ClusterRole fix
(https://github.com/kubernetes/kube-state-metrics/pull/717)
* Refresh rules and dashboards from upstreams
* Add new Kubernetes "workload" dashboards
* View pods in a workload (deployment/daemonset/statefulset)
* View workloads in a namespace
* Allow traffic from Grafana to Prometheus in monitoring
* Allow traffic from Prometheus to Prometheus in monitoring
* NetworkPolicy denies non-whitelisted traffic. Define policy
to allow other access
* Set resource requests and limits for Grafana and CLUO
* Set resource requests for Prometheus, but allow usage
to grow since needs vary widely
* Leave nginx without resource requests/limits for now,
its typically well behaved
* Heapster addon powers `kubectl top`
* In early Kubernetes, people legitimately used and expected
`kubectl top` to work, so the optional addon was provided
* Today the standards are different. Many better monitoring
tools exist, that are also less coupled to Kubernetes "kubectl
top" reliance on a non-core extensions means its not in-scope
for minimal Kubernetes clusters. No more exceptionalism
* Finally, Heapster isn't that useful anymore. Its manifests
have no need for Typhoon-specific modification
* Look to prior releases if you still wish to apply heapster
* Collate upstream rules, alerts, and dashboards and tune for use
in Typhoon
* Previously, a well-chosen (but older) set of rules, alerts, and
dashboards were maintained to reflect metric name changes
Dalton Hubble
Jordan Pittier