* Kubelet `--lock-file` and `--exit-on-lock-contention` date
back to usage of bootkube and at one point running Kubelet
in a "self-hosted" style whereby an on-host Kubelet (rkt)
started pods, but then a Kubelet DaemonSet was scheduled
and able to take over (hence self-hosted). `lock-file` and
`exit-on-lock-contention` flags supported this pivot. The
pattern has been out of favor (in bootkube too) for years
because of dueling Kubelet complexity
* Typhoon runs Kubelet as a container via an on-host systemd
unit using podman (Fedora CoreOS) or rkt (Flatcar Linux). In
fact, Typhoon no longer uses bootkube or control plane pivot
(let alone Kubelet pivot) and uses static pods since v1.16.0
* https://github.com/poseidon/typhoon/pull/536
* Enable terraform-provider-ct `strict` mode for parsing
Container Linux Configs and snippets
* Fix Container Linux Config systemd unit syntax `enable`
(old) to `enabled`
* Align with Fedora CoreOS which uses strict mode already
* Build Kubelet container images internally and publish
to Quay and Dockerhub (new) as an alternative in case of
registry outage or breach
* Use our infra to provide single and multi-arch (default)
Kublet images for possible future use
* Docs: Show how to use alternative Kubelet images via
snippets and a systemd dropin (builds on #737)
Changes:
* Update docs with changes to Kubelet image building
* If you prefer to trust images built by Quay/Dockerhub,
automated image builds are still available with unique
tags (albeit with some limitations):
* Quay automated builds are tagged `build-{short_sha}`
(limit: only amd64)
* Dockerhub automated builts are tagged `build-{tag}`
and `build-master` (limit: only amd64, no shas)
Links:
* Kubelet: https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet
* Docs: https://typhoon.psdn.io/topics/security/#container-images
* Registries:
* quay.io/poseidon/kubelet
* docker.io/psdn/kubelet
* Write the systemd kubelet.service to use `KUBELET_IMAGE`
as the Kubelet. This provides a nice way to use systemd
dropins to temporarily override the image (e.g. during a
registry outage)
Note: Only Typhoon Kubelet images and registries are supported.
* Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver
* Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that
may be used as a bootstrap token
* Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token)
to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use
the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver
as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for
kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue
a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours)
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper`
ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole
* Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the
scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of
the node itself
* Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained
as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups
need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need
continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting
itself maliciously
Security notes:
1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME`
and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization
to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction
admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This
is the primary security motivation.
2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity
as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig.
It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still
allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig
3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers
a slight security improvement.
* An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the
bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew
their access
* A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled
by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token
to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client
certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However,
replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster
environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical
benefit.
* Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice
4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet
clients have more identity information, which can improve the
utility of audits and future features
Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/
Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
* No change to Fedora CoreOS modules
* For Container Linx AWS and Azure, change the `os_image` default
from coreos-stable to flatcar-stable
* For Container Linux GCP and DigitalOcean, change `os_image` to
be required since users should upload a Flatcar Linux image and
set the variable
* For Container Linux bare-metal, recommend users change the
`os_channel` to Flatcar Linux. No actual module change.
* Fix delete-node service that runs on worker (cloud-only)
shutdown to delete a Kubernetes node. Regressed in #669
(unreleased)
* Use rkt `--exec` to invoke kubectl binary in the kubelet
image
* Use podman `--entrypoint` to invoke the kubectl binary in
the kubelet image
* Kubernetes plans to stop releasing the hyperkube container image
* Upstream will continue to publish `kube-apiserver`, `kube-controller-manager`,
`kube-scheduler`, and `kube-proxy` container images to `k8s.gcr.io`
* Upstream will publish Kubelet only as a binary for distros to package,
either as a DEB/RPM on traditional distros or a container image on
container-optimized operating systems
* Typhoon will package the upstream Kubelet (checksummed) and its
dependencies as a container image for use on CoreOS Container Linux,
Flatcar Linux, and Fedora CoreOS
* Update the Typhoon container image security policy to list
`quay.io/poseidon/kubelet`as an official distributed artifact
Hyperkube: https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/88676
Kubelet Container Image: https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet
Kubelet Quay Repo: https://quay.io/repository/poseidon/kubelet
* Change kubelet.service on Container Linux nodes to ExecStart Kubelet
inline to replace the use of the host OS kubelet-wrapper script
* Express rkt run flags and volume mounts in a clear, uniform way to
make the Kubelet service easier to audit, manage, and understand
* Eliminate reliance on a Container Linux kubelet-wrapper script
* Typhoon for Fedora CoreOS developed a kubelet.service that similarly
uses an inline ExecStart (except with podman instead of rkt) and a
more minimal set of volume mounts. Adopt the volume improvements:
* Change Kubelet /etc/kubernetes volume to read-only
* Change Kubelet /etc/resolv.conf volume to read-only
* Remove unneeded /var/lib/cni volume mount
Background:
* kubelet-wrapper was added in CoreOS around the time of Kubernetes v1.0
to simplify running a CoreOS-built hyperkube ACI image via rkt-fly. The
script defaults are no longer ideal (e.g. rkt's notion of trust dates
back to quay.io ACI image serving and signing, which informed the OCI
standard images we use today, though they still lack rkt's signing ideas).
* Shipping kubelet-wrapper was regretted at CoreOS, but remains in the
distro for compatibility. The script is not updated to track hyperkube
changes, but it is stable and kubelet.env overrides bridge most gaps
* Typhoon Container Linux nodes have used kubelet-wrapper to rkt/rkt-fly
run the Kubelet via the official k8s.gcr.io hyperkube image using overrides
(new image registry, new image format, restart handling, new mounts, new
entrypoint in v1.17).
* Observation: Most of what it takes to run a Kubelet container is defined
in Typhoon, not in kubelet-wrapper. The wrapper's value is now undermined
by having to workaround its dated defaults. Typhoon may be better served
defining Kubelet.service explicitly
* Typhoon for Fedora CoreOS developed a kubelet.service without the use
of a host OS kubelet-wrapper which is both clearer and eliminated some
volume mounts
* Rename Container Linux Config (CLC) files to *.yaml to align
with Fedora CoreOS Config (FCC) files and for syntax highlighting
* Replace common uses of Terraform `element` (which wraps around)
with `list[index]` syntax to surface index errors
* Review variables available in AWS kubernetes and workers
modules and documentation
* Switching between spot and on-demand has worked since
Terraform v0.12
* Generally, there are too many knobs. Less useful ones
should be de-emphasized or removed
* Remove `cluster_domain_suffix` documentation
* Document worker pools `node_labels` variable to set the
initial node labels for a homogeneous set of workers
* Document `worker_node_labels` convenience variable to
set the initial node labels for default worker nodes
* Drop `node-role.kubernetes.io/master` and
`node-role.kubernetes.io/node` node labels
* Kubelet (v1.16) now rejects the node labels used
in the kubectl get nodes ROLES output
* https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/75457
* terraform-provider-aws v2.23.0 allows AWS root block devices
to enable encryption by default.
* Require updating terraform-provider-aws to v2.23.0 or higher
* Enable root EBS device encryption by default for controller
instances and worker instances in auto-scaling groups
For comparison:
* Google Cloud persistent disks have been encrypted by
default for years
* Azure managed disk encryption is not ready yet (#486)
* For Container Linux or Flatcar Linux alpha/beta/stable,
continue using the `cgroupfs` driver
* For Fedora Atomic, continue using the `systemd` driver
* For Flatcar Linux Edge, use the `systemd` driver
* Replace v0.11 bracket type hints with Terraform v0.12 list expressions
* Use expression syntax instead of interpolated strings, where suggested
* Update AWS tutorial and worker pools documentation
* Define Terraform and plugin version requirements in versions.tf
* Require aws ~> 2.7 to support Terraform v0.12
* Require ct ~> 0.3.2 to support Terraform v0.12
* This change affects users who use worker pools on AWS, GCP, or
Azure with a Container Linux derivative
* Rename worker pool modules' `count` variable to `worker_count`,
because `count` will be a reserved variable name in Terraform v0.12
* Add ability to load balance TCP applications (e.g. NodePort)
* Output the network load balancer ARN as `nlb_id`
* Accept a `worker_target_groups` (ARN) list to which worker
instances should be added
* AWS NLBs and target groups don't support UDP
