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Enable Kubelet TLS bootstrap and NodeRestriction
* Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver * Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that may be used as a bootstrap token * Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token) to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours) * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper` ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole * Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of the node itself * Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting itself maliciously Security notes: 1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME` and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This is the primary security motivation. 2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig. It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig 3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers a slight security improvement. * An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew their access * A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However, replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical benefit. * Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice 4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet clients have more identity information, which can improve the utility of audits and future features Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/ Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ systemd:
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enable: true
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contents: |
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[Unit]
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Description=Kubelet via Hyperkube
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Description=Kubelet
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Wants=rpc-statd.service
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[Service]
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ExecStartPre=/bin/mkdir -p /etc/kubernetes/cni/net.d
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@ -67,13 +67,14 @@ systemd:
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--anonymous-auth=false \
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--authentication-token-webhook \
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--authorization-mode=Webhook \
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--bootstrap-kubeconfig=/etc/kubernetes/kubeconfig \
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--client-ca-file=/etc/kubernetes/ca.crt \
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--cluster_dns=${cluster_dns_service_ip} \
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--cluster_domain=${cluster_domain_suffix} \
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--cni-conf-dir=/etc/kubernetes/cni/net.d \
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--exit-on-lock-contention \
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--healthz-port=0 \
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--kubeconfig=/etc/kubernetes/kubeconfig \
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--kubeconfig=/var/lib/kubelet/kubeconfig \
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--lock-file=/var/run/lock/kubelet.lock \
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--network-plugin=cni \
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--node-labels=node.kubernetes.io/node \
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@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ systemd:
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%{~ endfor ~}
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--pod-manifest-path=/etc/kubernetes/manifests \
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--read-only-port=0 \
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--rotate-certificates \
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--volume-plugin-dir=/var/lib/kubelet/volumeplugins
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ExecStop=-/usr/bin/rkt stop --uuid-file=/var/cache/kubelet-pod.uuid
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Restart=always
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