Enable Kubelet TLS bootstrap and NodeRestriction

* Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver
* Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that
may be used as a bootstrap token
* Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token)
to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use
the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver
as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for
kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue
a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours)
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper`
ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole
* Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects
(`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole
* Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the
scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of
the node itself
* Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained
as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups
need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need
continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting
itself maliciously

Security notes:

1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME`
and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization
to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction
admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This
is the primary security motivation.

2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity
as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig.
It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still
allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig

3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers
a slight security improvement.
  * An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the
  bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew
  their access
  * A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled
  by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token
  to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client
  certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However,
  replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster
  environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical
  benefit.
  * Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice

4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet
clients have more identity information, which can improve the
utility of audits and future features

Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/
Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
This commit is contained in:
Dalton Hubble
2020-04-25 16:50:51 -07:00
parent 38a6bddd06
commit fd044ee117
33 changed files with 101 additions and 56 deletions

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Kubernetes assets (kubeconfig, manifests)
module "bootstrap" {
source = "git::https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap.git?ref=c62c7f5a1a3a3f9cebe7c1382077ad2dbf3727e6"
source = "git::https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap.git?ref=924beb4b0cb3ca076c29c85983070d0f66dddc5c"
cluster_name = var.cluster_name
api_servers = [format("%s.%s", var.cluster_name, var.dns_zone)]

View File

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ systemd:
enable: true
contents: |
[Unit]
Description=Kubelet via Hyperkube
Description=Kubelet
Wants=rpc-statd.service
[Service]
Environment=KUBELET_CGROUP_DRIVER=${cgroup_driver}
@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ systemd:
--anonymous-auth=false \
--authentication-token-webhook \
--authorization-mode=Webhook \
--bootstrap-kubeconfig=/etc/kubernetes/kubeconfig \
--cgroup-driver=$${KUBELET_CGROUP_DRIVER} \
--client-ca-file=/etc/kubernetes/ca.crt \
--cluster_dns=${cluster_dns_service_ip} \
@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ systemd:
--cni-conf-dir=/etc/kubernetes/cni/net.d \
--exit-on-lock-contention \
--healthz-port=0 \
--kubeconfig=/etc/kubernetes/kubeconfig \
--kubeconfig=/var/lib/kubelet/kubeconfig \
--lock-file=/var/run/lock/kubelet.lock \
--network-plugin=cni \
--node-labels=node.kubernetes.io/master \
@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ systemd:
--pod-manifest-path=/etc/kubernetes/manifests \
--read-only-port=0 \
--register-with-taints=node-role.kubernetes.io/master=:NoSchedule \
--rotate-certificates \
--volume-plugin-dir=/var/lib/kubelet/volumeplugins
ExecStop=-/usr/bin/rkt stop --uuid-file=/var/cache/kubelet-pod.uuid
Restart=always

View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ systemd:
enable: true
contents: |
[Unit]
Description=Kubelet via Hyperkube
Description=Kubelet
Wants=rpc-statd.service
[Service]
Environment=KUBELET_CGROUP_DRIVER=${cgroup_driver}
@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ systemd:
--anonymous-auth=false \
--authentication-token-webhook \
--authorization-mode=Webhook \
--bootstrap-kubeconfig=/etc/kubernetes/kubeconfig \
--cgroup-driver=$${KUBELET_CGROUP_DRIVER} \
--client-ca-file=/etc/kubernetes/ca.crt \
--cluster_dns=${cluster_dns_service_ip} \
@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ systemd:
--cni-conf-dir=/etc/kubernetes/cni/net.d \
--exit-on-lock-contention \
--healthz-port=0 \
--kubeconfig=/etc/kubernetes/kubeconfig \
--kubeconfig=/var/lib/kubelet/kubeconfig \
--lock-file=/var/run/lock/kubelet.lock \
--network-plugin=cni \
--node-labels=node.kubernetes.io/node \
@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ systemd:
%{~ endfor ~}
--pod-manifest-path=/etc/kubernetes/manifests \
--read-only-port=0 \
--rotate-certificates \
--volume-plugin-dir=/var/lib/kubelet/volumeplugins
ExecStop=-/usr/bin/rkt stop --uuid-file=/var/cache/kubelet-pod.uuid
Restart=always