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README: Add IRC link, CHANGES.md, and minor fixes
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# Security
Typhoon aims to be minimal and secure. We're running it ourselves after all.
docs: Add details about security features
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## Overview
**Kubernetes**
* etcd with peer-to-peer and client-auth TLS
Enable Kubelet TLS bootstrap and NodeRestriction * Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver * Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that may be used as a bootstrap token * Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token) to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours) * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper` ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole * Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of the node itself * Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting itself maliciously Security notes: 1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME` and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This is the primary security motivation. 2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig. It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig 3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers a slight security improvement. * An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew their access * A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However, replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical benefit. * Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice 4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet clients have more identity information, which can improve the utility of audits and future features Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/ Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
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* Kubelets TLS bootstrap certificates (72 hours)
* Generated TLS certificate (365 days) for admin `kubeconfig`
* [NodeRestriction](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/node/) is enabled to limit Kubelet authorization
* [Role-Based Access Control](https://kubernetes.io/docs/admin/authorization/rbac/) is enabled. Apps must define RBAC policies for API access
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* Workloads run on worker nodes only, unless they tolerate the master taint
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* Kubernetes [Network Policy](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/) and Calico [NetworkPolicy](https://docs.projectcalico.org/latest/reference/calicoctl/resources/networkpolicy) support [^1]
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Default to Calico as the CNI provider on Azure/DigitalOcean * Change `networking` default from flannel to calico on Azure and DigitalOcean * AWS, bare-metal, and Google Cloud continue to default to Calico (as they have since v1.7.5) * Typhoon now defaults to using Calico and supporting NetworkPolicy on all platforms
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[^1]: Requires `networking = "calico"`. Calico is the default on all platforms (AWS, Azure, bare-metal, DigitalOcean, and Google Cloud).
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**Hosts**
* Container Linux auto-updates are enabled
* Hosts limit logins to SSH key-based auth (user "core")
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* SELinux enforcing mode [^2]
[^2]: SELinux is enforcing on Fedora CoreOS, permissive on Flatcar Linux.
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**Platform**
* Cloud firewalls limit access to ssh, kube-apiserver, and ingress
* No cluster credentials are stored in Matchbox (used for bare-metal)
* No cluster credentials are stored in Digital Ocean metadata
* Cluster credentials are stored in AWS metadata (for ASGs)
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* Cluster credentials are stored in Azure metadata (for scale sets)
* Cluster credentials are stored in Google Cloud metadata (for managed instance groups)
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* No account credentials are available to Digital Ocean droplets
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* No account credentials are available to AWS EC2 instances (no IAM permissions)
* No account credentials are available to Azure instances (no IAM permissions)
* No account credentials are available to Google Cloud instances (no IAM permissions)
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## Precautions
Typhoon limits exposure to many security threats, but it is not a silver bullet. As usual,
* Do not run untrusted images or accept manifests from strangers
* Do not give untrusted users a shell behind your firewall
* Define network policies for your namespaces
Switch from upstream hyperkube image to individual images * Kubernetes plans to stop releasing the hyperkube container image * Upstream will continue to publish `kube-apiserver`, `kube-controller-manager`, `kube-scheduler`, and `kube-proxy` container images to `k8s.gcr.io` * Upstream will publish Kubelet only as a binary for distros to package, either as a DEB/RPM on traditional distros or a container image on container-optimized operating systems * Typhoon will package the upstream Kubelet (checksummed) and its dependencies as a container image for use on CoreOS Container Linux, Flatcar Linux, and Fedora CoreOS * Update the Typhoon container image security policy to list `quay.io/poseidon/kubelet`as an official distributed artifact Hyperkube: https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/88676 Kubelet Container Image: https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet Kubelet Quay Repo: https://quay.io/repository/poseidon/kubelet
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## Container Images
README: Add IRC link, CHANGES.md, and minor fixes
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Switch from upstream hyperkube image to individual images * Kubernetes plans to stop releasing the hyperkube container image * Upstream will continue to publish `kube-apiserver`, `kube-controller-manager`, `kube-scheduler`, and `kube-proxy` container images to `k8s.gcr.io` * Upstream will publish Kubelet only as a binary for distros to package, either as a DEB/RPM on traditional distros or a container image on container-optimized operating systems * Typhoon will package the upstream Kubelet (checksummed) and its dependencies as a container image for use on CoreOS Container Linux, Flatcar Linux, and Fedora CoreOS * Update the Typhoon container image security policy to list `quay.io/poseidon/kubelet`as an official distributed artifact Hyperkube: https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/88676 Kubelet Container Image: https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet Kubelet Quay Repo: https://quay.io/repository/poseidon/kubelet
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Typhoon uses upstream container images (where possible) and upstream binaries.
!!! note
Kubernetes releases `kubelet` as a binary for distros to package, either as a DEB/RPM on traditional distros or as a container image for container-optimized operating systems.
Typhoon [packages](https://github.com/poseidon/kubelet) the upstream Kubelet and its dependencies as a [container image](https://quay.io/repository/poseidon/kubelet) for use in Typhoon. The upstream Kubelet binary is checksummed and packaged directly. Quay automated builds provide verifiability and confidence in image contents.
README: Add IRC link, CHANGES.md, and minor fixes
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## Disclosures
docs: Add details about security features
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If you find security issues, please email dghubble at gmail. If the issue lies in upstream Kubernetes, please inform upstream Kubernetes as well.
README: Add IRC link, CHANGES.md, and minor fixes
2017-09-23 22:02:18 +02:00