typhoon/digital-ocean/flatcar-linux/kubernetes/butane/worker.yaml

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variant: flatcar
version: 1.0.0
systemd:
units:
- name: docker.service
enabled: true
- name: locksmithd.service
mask: true
- name: kubelet.path
enabled: true
contents: |
[Unit]
Description=Watch for kubeconfig
[Path]
PathExists=/etc/kubernetes/kubeconfig
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
- name: wait-for-dns.service
enabled: true
contents: |
[Unit]
Description=Wait for DNS entries
Wants=systemd-resolved.service
Before=kubelet.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=true
ExecStart=/bin/sh -c 'while ! /usr/bin/grep '^[^#[:space:]]' /etc/resolv.conf > /dev/null; do sleep 1; done'
[Install]
RequiredBy=kubelet.service
- name: kubelet.service
contents: |
[Unit]
Enable Kubelet TLS bootstrap and NodeRestriction * Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver * Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that may be used as a bootstrap token * Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token) to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours) * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper` ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole * Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of the node itself * Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting itself maliciously Security notes: 1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME` and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This is the primary security motivation. 2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig. It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig 3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers a slight security improvement. * An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew their access * A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However, replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical benefit. * Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice 4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet clients have more identity information, which can improve the utility of audits and future features Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/ Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
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Description=Kubelet
Requires=docker.service
After=docker.service
Requires=coreos-metadata.service
After=coreos-metadata.service
Wants=rpc-statd.service
[Service]
Environment=KUBELET_IMAGE=quay.io/poseidon/kubelet:v1.30.3
EnvironmentFile=/run/metadata/coreos
ExecStartPre=/bin/mkdir -p /etc/cni/net.d
ExecStartPre=/bin/mkdir -p /etc/kubernetes/manifests
ExecStartPre=/bin/mkdir -p /opt/cni/bin
ExecStartPre=/bin/mkdir -p /var/lib/calico
ExecStartPre=/bin/mkdir -p /var/lib/kubelet/volumeplugins
ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/bash -c "grep 'certificate-authority-data' /etc/kubernetes/kubeconfig | awk '{print $2}' | base64 -d > /etc/kubernetes/ca.crt"
# Podman, rkt, or runc run container processes, whereas docker run
# is a client to a daemon and requires workarounds to use within a
# systemd unit. https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/6791
ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/docker run -d \
--name kubelet \
--privileged \
--pid host \
--network host \
-v /etc/cni/net.d:/etc/cni/net.d:ro \
-v /etc/kubernetes:/etc/kubernetes:ro \
-v /etc/machine-id:/etc/machine-id:ro \
-v /usr/lib/os-release:/etc/os-release:ro \
-v /lib/modules:/lib/modules:ro \
-v /run:/run \
-v /sys/fs/cgroup:/sys/fs/cgroup \
-v /var/lib/calico:/var/lib/calico:ro \
-v /var/lib/containerd:/var/lib/containerd \
-v /var/lib/kubelet:/var/lib/kubelet:rshared \
-v /var/log:/var/log \
-v /opt/cni/bin:/opt/cni/bin \
$${KUBELET_IMAGE} \
Enable Kubelet TLS bootstrap and NodeRestriction * Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver * Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that may be used as a bootstrap token * Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token) to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours) * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper` ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole * Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of the node itself * Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting itself maliciously Security notes: 1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME` and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This is the primary security motivation. 2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig. It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig 3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers a slight security improvement. * An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew their access * A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However, replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical benefit. * Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice 4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet clients have more identity information, which can improve the utility of audits and future features Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/ Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
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--bootstrap-kubeconfig=/etc/kubernetes/kubeconfig \
--config=/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.yaml \
--container-runtime-endpoint=unix:///run/containerd/containerd.sock \
--hostname-override=$${COREOS_DIGITALOCEAN_IPV4_PRIVATE_0} \
Enable Kubelet TLS bootstrap and NodeRestriction * Enable bootstrap token authentication on kube-apiserver * Generate the bootstrap.kubernetes.io/token Secret that may be used as a bootstrap token * Generate a bootstrap kubeconfig (with a bootstrap token) to be securely distributed to nodes. Each Kubelet will use the bootstrap kubeconfig to authenticate to kube-apiserver as `system:bootstrappers` and send a node-unique CSR for kube-controller-manager to automatically approve to issue a Kubelet certificate and kubeconfig (expires in 72 hours) * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the `system:node-bootstrapper` ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr nodeclient ClusterRole * Add ClusterRoleBinding for bootstrap token subjects (`system:bootstrappers`) to have the csr selfnodeclient ClusterRole * Enable NodeRestriction admission controller to limit the scope of Node or Pod objects a Kubelet can modify to those of the node itself * Ability for a Kubelet to delete its Node object is retained as preemptible nodes or those in auto-scaling instance groups need to be able to remove themselves on shutdown. This need continues to have precedence over any risk of a node deleting itself maliciously Security notes: 1. Issued Kubelet certificates authenticate as user `system:node:NAME` and group `system:nodes` and are limited in their authorization to perform API operations by Node authorization and NodeRestriction admission. Previously, a Kubelet's authorization was broader. This is the primary security motivation. 2. The bootstrap kubeconfig credential has the same sensitivity as the previous generated TLS client-certificate kubeconfig. It must be distributed securely to nodes. Its compromise still allows an attacker to obtain a Kubelet kubeconfig 3. Bootstrapping Kubelet kubeconfig's with a limited lifetime offers a slight security improvement. * An attacker who obtains the kubeconfig can likely obtain the bootstrap kubeconfig as well, to obtain the ability to renew their access * A compromised bootstrap kubeconfig could plausibly be handled by replacing the bootstrap token Secret, distributing the token to new nodes, and expiration. Whereas a compromised TLS-client certificate kubeconfig can't be revoked (no CRL). However, replacing a bootstrap token can be impractical in real cluster environments, so the limited lifetime is mostly a theoretical benefit. * Cluster CSR objects are visible via kubectl which is nice 4. Bootstrapping node-unique Kubelet kubeconfigs means Kubelet clients have more identity information, which can improve the utility of audits and future features Rel: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kubelet-tls-bootstrapping/ Rel: https://github.com/poseidon/terraform-render-bootstrap/pull/185
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--kubeconfig=/var/lib/kubelet/kubeconfig \
--node-labels=node.kubernetes.io/node
ExecStart=docker logs -f kubelet
ExecStop=docker stop kubelet
ExecStopPost=docker rm kubelet
Restart=always
RestartSec=5
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
storage:
directories:
- path: /etc/kubernetes
mode: 0755
files:
- path: /etc/kubernetes/kubelet.yaml
mode: 0644
contents:
inline: |
apiVersion: kubelet.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: KubeletConfiguration
authentication:
anonymous:
enabled: false
webhook:
enabled: true
x509:
clientCAFile: /etc/kubernetes/ca.crt
authorization:
mode: Webhook
cgroupDriver: systemd
clusterDNS:
- ${cluster_dns_service_ip}
clusterDomain: ${cluster_domain_suffix}
healthzPort: 0
rotateCertificates: true
shutdownGracePeriod: 45s
shutdownGracePeriodCriticalPods: 30s
staticPodPath: /etc/kubernetes/manifests
readOnlyPort: 0
resolvConf: /run/systemd/resolve/resolv.conf
volumePluginDir: /var/lib/kubelet/volumeplugins
- path: /etc/systemd/logind.conf.d/inhibitors.conf
contents:
inline: |
[Login]
InhibitDelayMaxSec=45s
- path: /etc/sysctl.d/max-user-watches.conf
mode: 0644
contents:
inline: |
fs.inotify.max_user_watches=16184